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FREE-SPEECH FORMALISM AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN*
ABSTRACT
The Roberts Court has shifted constitutional law in a formalist
direction. This Essay explains the Court’s formalism and its causes
and consequences in First Amendment free-expression cases. The
thesis is that the current conservative justices’ reliance on formalism
intertwines with their attitudes toward public and private spheres
of activity. Their attitudes toward the public-private dichotomy are,
in turn, shaped by their political ideologies as well as by the contem-
porary practices of democratic government, which have shifted
significantly over American history. Formalism contains an inherent
political tilt favoring those who already wield power in the private
sphere. Formalism favors the wealthy over the poor, whites over peo-
ple of color, men over women, straights over LGBTQ. In a formalist
legal regime, the government must efface, deny, or ignore all of the
structures of power embedded in the private sphere, including racism,
sexism, antisemitism, and homophobia. Thus, formalism matters,
but does not determine outcomes in free-speech cases. Ultimately,
what animates most of the Court’s free-expression decisions, whether
formalist or not, is a conservative (neoliberal) commitment to pro-
tecting the private sphere, especially the economic marketplace and
wealthy economic actors, while simultaneously denigrating and weak-
ening government.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court under Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts
has shifted constitutional law in a formalist direction.1 Constitutional
* Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct
Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming.
1. See Stephen M. Feldman, (Same) Sex, Lies, and Democracy: Tradition, Religion,
and Substantive Due Process (With an Emphasis on Obergefell v. Hodges), 24 WM. &
47
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formalism is most obvious in equal protection cases. In Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, decided in 1995, the Rehnquist Court held
that all race-based affirmative action programs are subject to strict
scrutiny.2 According to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s majority
opinion, the government could justify an affirmative action program
only if it could prove the program was narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling government purpose.3 O’Connor explained, however, the
government might be able, in some circumstances, to adopt an affir-
mative action program that would pass constitutional muster.4 Jus-
tices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas both wrote concurrences
arguing for a more formal concept of equal protection that would
preclude the government from ever justifying affirmative action.5
From their perspective, the Constitution mandated that the govern-
ment be color-blind.6
The Roberts Court clarified and furthered the judicial commit-
ment to a formal concept of equal protection. Chief Justice John
Roberts’ majority opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. 1, decided in 2007, applied strict scrutiny
and invalidated affirmative action programs allowing school officials
to consider race when assigning students to elementary and high
schools.7 In a plurality section of his opinion, Roberts insisted that
affirmative action programs and Jim Crow laws are constitutionally
indistinguishable.8 A rule is a rule. The rule of equality embodied in
Brown v. Board of Education, Roberts explained, mandated the in-
validation of the Parents Involved affirmative action programs.9 “The
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discrimi-
nating on the basis of race.”10
While less obvious, the Court has also articulated a formal
concept of free expression. This Essay explains the Court’s formalism
and its causes and consequences in First Amendment cases. The
MARY BILL RTS. J. 341, 359–67 (2015) (discussing three overlaps, including formalism,
between Lochner-era Court and Roberts Court); Stephen M. Feldman, Chief Justice
Roberts’s Marbury Moment: The Affordable Care Act Case (NFIB v. Sebelius), 13 WYO.
L. REV. 335, 338–46 (2013) [hereinafter Feldman, Chief] (discussing formalism of Rehnquist
and Roberts Courts as echoing Lochner era).
2. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 237–38.
5. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 241
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
6. See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 1 (1992) (arguing that benign
racial classifications were inconsistent with the history of the Constitution).
7. 551 U.S. 701, 720–35 (2007).
8. See id. at 730–31 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion).
9. Id. at 745–48 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion).
10. Id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing constitutional color-blindness).
2019] FREE-SPEECH FORMALISM AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE 49
thesis is that the current conservative justices’ reliance on formal-
ism intertwines with their attitudes toward public and private spheres
of activity. Their attitudes toward the public-private dichotomy are,
in turn, shaped by their political ideologies as well as by the contem-
porary practices of democratic government, which have shifted sig-
nificantly over American history.11 Thus, formalism matters, but does
not determine outcomes in free-speech cases. Ultimately, what ani-
mates most of the Court’s free-expression decisions, whether formalist
or not, is a conservative (neoliberal) commitment to protecting the
private sphere, especially the economic marketplace and wealthy
economic actors, while simultaneously denigrating and weakening
government. Part I explains legal formalism. Part II explains why
the Roberts Court favors legal formalism in many constitutional
cases. Part III focuses on formalism in free-expression cases. This
Essay ends with a brief Conclusion.
To be clear, I treat law and politics as dynamically interacting in
Supreme Court decision-making.12 While I discuss the political causes
and effects of the Court’s constitutional decisions, I do not intend to
suggest that law is the handmaiden of politics.13 Law is neither mere
window dressing nor subterfuge for political machinations.14 But law
11. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 3 (2008) [hereinafter FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION]; STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, THE
NEW ROBERTS COURT, DONALD TRUMP, AND OUR FAILING CONSTITUTION 19–62 (2017)
[hereinafter FELDMAN, FAILING CONSTITUTION] (discussing founding-era conceptions of
government and free expression). For a classic article linking the form and substance of
legal rules in private law cases, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
12. For discussions of the dynamic interaction between law and politics, see the fol-
lowing articles: Stephen M. Feldman, Nothing New Under the Sun: The Law-Politics
Dynamic in Supreme Court Decision Making, 2017 PEPP. L. REV. 44 (2018); Stephen M.
Feldman, Fighting the Tofu: Law and Politics in Scholarship and Adjudication, 14
CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 91 (2015) [hereinafter Feldman, Tofu]; Stephen M.
Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law and Politics Into Mayonnaise, 12 GEO.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 60 (2014) [hereinafter Feldman, Alchemy]; Stephen M. Feldman, The
Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the Internal and External Views of
Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 89 (2005).
13. For purposes of understanding legal interpretation, I define politics capaciously.
For example, if a judge’s religious, cultural, or economic background influences how he
or she construes a text, then the judicial decision is not based on pure law and could be
deemed political. Feldman, Tofu, supra note 12, at 94–95; see Barry Friedman, The Politics
of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 271 (2005) (defining politics capaciously); Gregory
C. Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of
Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 492 (2004) (lower court study conclud-
ing judge’s religion is most salient factor affecting outcome of religious-freedom cases).
14. Many political scientists treat Supreme Court decision-making as being determined
solely by politics. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 1 (1993). With regard to legal reasoning and judicial opinions, Martin
Shapiro wrote: “Courts and judges always lie. Lying is the nature of the judicial activity.”
Martin Shapiro, Judges As Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 156 (1994).
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should never be understood as being separate and independent from
politics.15 In most cases, the justices sincerely interpret the relevant
legal texts, but interpretation is never mechanical. The justices’ politi-
cal horizons always influence their interpretive understandings of
the texts.16 For this reason, the justices’ legal interpretations and
conclusions typically coincide with their respective political prefer-
ences.17 This Essay, to a degree, explores the operation of the law-
politics dynamic in the specific context of free-speech formalism.18
Given that I discuss the politics of various justices throughout
this Essay, the political characterization of some of the justices will
be helpful at the outset. My political characterizations of the various
justices follows the normal political categories as articulated by many
political scientists. Ever since the conservative Thomas replaced the
liberal Thurgood Marshall in 1991, conservative blocs of justices have
controlled the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.19 On the Rehnquist
Court, the bloc of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and Thomas often voted together and
handed down conservative decisions.20 On the Roberts Court, the
15. Court critics who complain about judicial activism typically suggest that the
justices are being political. E.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 2 (1990);
Lino A. Graglia, Originalism and the Constitution: Does Originalism Always Provide the
Answer?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 74–75 (2011).
16. Feldman, Alchemy, supra note 12, at 79–80 (explaining the concept of an inter-
pretive horizon and the formation of horizons).
17. Id.
18. A number of legal scholars and political scientists have been exploring the law-
politics dynamic in a variety of contexts. Examples include the following: HOWARD
GILLMAN, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Institutionalism
and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-
MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 65 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman
eds., 1999); RONALD KAHN & KEN I. KERSCH, Introduction to THE SUPREME COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006); LUCAS
A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789–2008 ix (2009). For
quantitative support for the operation of a law-politics dynamic, see MICHAEL A. BAILEY
& FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUS-
TICES MAKE 15–16 (2011); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY vii (2006).
19. For rankings of Supreme Court justices based on political ideology, see LEE EPSTEIN
ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 106–16 (2013) (including comparisons with
the Martin-Quinn scores (accounting for changes over time), and the Segal-Cover scores
(quantifying Court nominees’ perceived political ideologies at the time of appointment),
and data drawn from Jeffrey Segal & Albert Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 557–65 (1989); updated in LEE EPSTEIN
& JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
(2005)); see also Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN.
L. REV. 1431, 1433 (2013) (focusing on the politics of justices in relation to business-
related decisions).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600 (2000) (invalidating the Vio-
lence Against Women Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 (1997) (invalidating
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bloc of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy,
and Samuel Alito (with Neil Gorsuch eventually replacing Scalia and
Brett Kavanaugh eventually replacing Kennedy) likewise voted to-
gether to hand down conservative decisions.21
I. WHAT IS LEGAL FORMALISM?
Legal formalism insists that judges logically apply legal rules
(and doctrines) without regard to individual parties, social context,
or the consequences of potential decisions.22 Identical rules apply to
all the same. The essence of formalism is captured in the phrase,
“Let them eat cake,” purportedly uttered by Marie Antoinette when
told that peasants had no bread.23 She had a rule: if one lacks bread,
then one should eat cake. And from her perspective, peasants and
royalty were all the same. If one societal group could eat cake, then
so could the other. The social fact or context revealing that peasants
lacked the wealth to purchase cake was irrelevant.24
Legal formalism seeks a pure law. In the history of American
legal thought, the first dean of Harvard Law School, C.C. Langdell,
and his disciples epitomized the jurisprudential belief and commit-
ment to formalism.25 Teaching in university-based law schools when
they initially developed after the Civil War, the Langdellians treated
law as a closed system of logically connected rules and axiomatic
principles that dictated judicial outcomes.26 The legal system oper-
ated autonomously from the rest of society. According to Langdellian
legal science, judges were to ignore the context of a dispute, the
likely societal consequences of a decision, and considerations of
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 550
(1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (focusing on tenth amendment).
21. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484, 2501–02 (2019) (holding that
political gerrymandering, no matter how extreme, is a nonjusticiable political question);
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013) (invalidating section of Voting Rights
Act); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (invalidating
parts of Affordable Care Act).
22. “A legal system is formal to the extent that its outcomes are dictated by demon-
strative (rationally compelling) reasoning.” Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45
U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 8 (1983); see id. at 11 (describing a formal legal system as seeking “objec-
tive tests [while] avoid[ing] vague standards, or rules that required determinations of
state of mind”).
23. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 495 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 5th ed. 1999).
24. For a philosophical discussion of formal deductive systems, see IRVING M. COPI,
SYMBOLIC LOGIC 157–64 (4th ed. 1973).
25. C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii–ix (2d ed.
1879) (preface to 1st ed.)
26.  Id.
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justice.27 Judges were to do one thing: logically apply the rules and
principles in a mechanical fashion.28
Nowadays, in constitutional jurisprudence, originalists are most
clearly committed to legal formalism. Most originalists demand that
judges discern the ostensibly objective meaning of the constitutional
text as it was understood at the time of its adoption.29 Constitutional
meaning, from this perspective, is static, fixed at the time of its rati-
fication, regardless of changing societal contexts.30 Scalia explained
that an originalist approach is “the only one that can justify courts
in denying force and effect to the unconstitutional enactments of duly
elected legislatures. . . . To hold a governmental Act to be unconstitu-
tional is not to announce that we forbid it, but that the Constitution
forbids it.”31 Meanwhile, Thomas adamantly insists that originalism
be followed to its apparent ends, regardless of societal consequences.32
Thus, he has concluded the Establishment Clause does not apply
against state and local governments; nothing in the Constitution
would prevent Wyoming, Oklahoma, or any other state from estab-
lishing an official religion.33
Over the years, legal formalism has been distinguished from more
realist, empirical, pragmatic, and substantive approaches to judicial
decision-making. For instance, early in the twentieth century, socio-
logical jurisprudents such as Roscoe Pound denounced Langdellian
legal science as “mechanical jurisprudence” for its arid and abstract
formalism.34 According to Pound, judges should sometimes perform
27. C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 21 (2d ed. 1880).
28. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 91–105 (2000) (discussing Langdellian legal
science). But cf., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE
ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 13–63 (2010) (arguing that Langdellians were not pure
formalists, but acknowledging that almost all legal historians characterize them as such).
29. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 5–6, 143–44 (1990); Randy E.
Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOYOLA L. REV. 611, 621 (1999); Gary
Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47,
48 (2006); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism:
A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
751, 761 (2009).
30. LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINAL-
ISM: A DEBATE 1, 4 (2011); Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About
Constitutional Assumptions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 660 (2009).
31. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original); see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1989).
32. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, No. 17-1717, slip op. at 49–55 (2019) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
33. Id.; Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49–50 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
34. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 620 (1908). For
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social engineering, making law for the good of society.35 In the late
1920s and early 1930s, American legal realism built on and ex-
tended the insights of sociological jurisprudence.36 Realists criticized
the Langdellians’ axiomatic principles and logically deduced rules as
“transcendental nonsense”—concepts with no basis in social reality.37
“[G]eneral propositions are empty,” wrote Karl Llewellyn.38 “[R]ules
alone . . . are worthless.”39 Rejecting formalism, realists turned to
social science research to remake the legal system, grounding legal
doctrines more firmly on empirical reality. According to Walter
Wheeler Cook, “[o]nly empirical observation can give one postulates
useful in any particular science, including legal science.”40 Hence,
Felix Cohen argued that judges should decide each case by attend-
ing closely to the factual details, weighing the specific and compet-
ing interests at stake, and considering the real-world consequences
that would follow from possible decisions.41 In current constitutional
jurisprudence, many scholars endorse interpretive pluralism, eclecti-
cism, or pragmatism, or in other words, living constitutionalism.42
From this perspective, a judge can consider a shifting variety of
factors, including original meaning, the framers’ intentions, practi-
cal consequences, judicial precedents, and so forth.43 Contrary to the
tenets of originalism, constitutional meaning is not static. Rather, it
“evolves, changes over time, and adapts to new circumstances, with-
out being formally amended.”44
an extensive discussion of Pound and his work, see N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND
KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1997).
35. Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 954–58
(1923); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 515 (1912).
36. Pound, supra note 34, at 609–10.
37. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 809 (1935).
38. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (1930).
39. Id.
40. Walter Wheeler Cook, Law and the Modern Mind, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 108, 113
(1931).
41. Cohen, supra note 37, at 839–40.
42. E.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1331, 1333 (1988) (defending pragmatism); Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional Interpre-
tation and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 283, 350 (2014)
(defending eclecticism). “Pragmatist constitutional adjudication is eclectic and uncertain:
it takes into account multiple sources, and rarely produces an unequivocal answer.”
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY x (2010).
43. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991) (specifying
“six modalities of [ ] argument” judges use to decide constitutional cases).
44. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1 (2010); see ROBERT W. BENNETT,
Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 79 (2011) (defending living constitutionalism).
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Formalists reject substantive approaches to judicial decision-
making as undermining the desired purity of law. Most important,
formalists argue that substantive approaches invite judges to inject
their political preferences or ideologies into adjudication. When socio-
logical jurisprudents instructed judges to make law, when realists
weighed the interests at stake in a case, or when living constitution-
alists considered the practical consequences of a decision in society,
they literally diverged from legal decision-making, at least according
to formalists. Formalists view politics as the antithesis of law.45 As
such, politics corrupts judicial decision-making. For this reason, Scalia
argued that the rule of law must be “the law of rules.”46 Politics and
law must be separate and independent. Indeed, originalists insist
that originalism is the only interpretive method that constrains judges
within the rule of law.47 That is, forms of living constitutionalism do
not even qualify as forms of legal interpretation.48 The insurmount-
able problem with living constitutionalism, Scalia insisted, is that
it invests judges with political discretion: “[I]t is the judges who
determine those [societal] needs and ‘find’ that changing law.”49
In a similar vein, legal process scholars, who dominated the
mid-twentieth century, emphasized the distinct processes of differ-
ent government institutions.50 According to Henry Hart, Herbert
Wechsler, Alexander Bickel, and other like-minded scholars, courts
and legislatures operated pursuant to processes unique to their
respective goals and functions.51 While legislatures channeled the
negotiating and compromising of political interests, courts decided
cases by following the process of “reasoned elaboration.”52 That is,
judges needed to articulate reasons for a decision, to explain those
45. Scalia, supra note 31, at 1187.
46. Id.
47. “You can’t beat somebody with nobody.” Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 849, 855 (1989).
48. “It takes a theory to beat a theory and, after a decade of trying, the opponents of
originalism have never congealed around an appealing and practical alternative.”
Barnett, supra note 29, at 617.
49. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 38 (1997).
50. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 33 (1962); HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW vii (tentative ed. 1958); HENRY M. HART, JR., & HERBERT WECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM xii (1953); Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–9 (1959).
51. For instance, the Preface to the first edition of Hart and Wechsler’s casebook, The
Federal Courts and the Federal System, stated: “In varying contexts we pose the issue
of what courts are good for—and are not good for—seeking thus to open up the whole
range of questions as to the appropriate relationship between the federal courts and
other organs of federal and state government.” HART & WECHSLER, supra note 50, at xii.
52. HART & SACKS, supra note 50, at 164–67.
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reasons in a detailed and coherent manner, and to relate the decision
to a relevant rule of law applied in a manner logically consistent with
precedent.53 In constitutional cases, reasoned elaboration translated
into a requirement that judges decide pursuant to “neutral principles,”
which supposedly precluded judges (or justices) from using rules or
principles that bore any political valence.54 If Supreme Court jus-
tices allowed their political preferences to influence a constitutional
decision, that decision would be illegitimate.55
II. WHY LEGAL FORMALISM NOW? THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY
Why do the conservative justices on the Roberts Court push for
legal formalism?56 The law-politics dichotomy, which undergirds
formalism, manifests another dichotomy central to the American
constitutional system: the separation between a private sphere and
a public sphere. The private sphere is the realm of individual action
and belief.57 It is the realm of the economic marketplace and com-
mercial intercourse, of property and contract rights, as well as other
individual rights and liberties such as the right to free exercise of
religion. The public sphere is the realm of government action.58 It is
where politics and democracy have sway. The private-public dichot-
omy is philosophically rooted in the Lockean distinction between
civil society and government.59 According to Locke, individuals leave
a state of nature for civil society because life in a state of nature
entails fear and uncertainty.60 Only after forming civil society, then,
do individuals consider the formation of a government.61 Thus, from
53. Id.
54. Wechsler, supra note 50, at 15–35; see BICKEL, supra note 50, at 49–59 (applying
Wechsler’s concept of neutral principles).
55. See Wechsler, supra note 50, at 31–35 (questioning the legitimacy of Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
56. See Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2119–20 (2018) [hereinafter Lakier, Antisubordinating] (arguing that,
starting in the 1970s, the Court has shifted toward formalism in First Amendment cases);
Genevieve Lakier, The First Amendment’s Real Lochner Problem, U. CHI. L. REV., at 64
(forthcoming) (arguing that the current Court’s First Amendment decisions are formalist).
57. Arnaud Sales, The Private, the Public and Civil Society: Social Realms and Power
Structures, 12 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 295, 297 (1991).
58. See id. at 298.
59. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 3–4, 48–49 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., 1952). For discussions of Locke’s writings, see JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE (1969); ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, John Locke, in HISTORY OF PO-
LITICAL PHILOSOPHY 476 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987).
60. According to Locke, the state of nature would not be as dangerous as Hobbes had
imagined. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 97, 186 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (describing
life in state of nature as “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”).
61. LOCKE, supra note 59, at 70–74, 119, 139; see id. at 44 (discussing civil society).
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the Lockean perspective, the private sphere of individual action is
separate from the public sphere of government action.
Lockean philosophy influenced the constitutional framers, but
civic republicanism was at least as important during the founding
era.62 The framers, bridging these distinct ideologies, did not view
individual rights as sacrosanct.63 To the contrary, they believed the
government, in accordance with republican democracy, could infringe
on or narrow individual rights so long as government officials virtu-
ously pursued the common good or general welfare rather than
partial or private interests.64 Unsurprisingly, throughout the early
nineteenth century, government repeatedly reached from the public
sphere into the private sphere in pursuit of the common good—even
if the government laws limited individual liberty in the economic
marketplace.65 In fact, during this era, law was understood to be an
instrument for “the release of [creative and economic] energy.”66 Gov-
ernment action was not generally considered antithetical to prosperity
in the marketplace.
Nevertheless, the relationship between the public and private
spheres has been anything but constant. For instance, spurred by
the arguments of industrialists and corporations, the Court in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries interpreted the com-
mon good in accord with laissez-faire ideology.67 The Court became
more protective of the economic marketplace, limiting government
62. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 xi (1998).
63. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT vii–viii; 506–52 (1975).
64. WOOD, supra note 62, at 46–90; e.g., The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison); The
Federalist No. 57 (James Madison). Those constitutional scholars who argue the framers
created a libertarian system centered around a capitalist marketplace ignore half of the
history. E.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004); RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION ix, 6–7, 37–38, 43, 45, 582 (2014). To
be sure, the framers cared deeply about protecting individual rights, including property
rights, as demonstrated by their constitutional protections of slavery as a legal institution
(most framers viewed slaves as property). FELDMAN, FAILING CONSTITUTION, supra note
11, at 36–46 (discussing the framers’ conception of the private sphere). But the framers
did not allow their concern for property rights to overcome their concern for republican
democratic government. Id. at 46–55.
65. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE 1 (1996) (describing many examples
of government acting for common good despite infringing on individual rights); e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Rice, 50 Mass. 253, 257, 259 (1845) (upholding economic regulation);
see FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 11, at 26–32 (discussing judicial review under
republican democracy before the Civil War).
66. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES 21 (1956). “[T]he nineteenth century was prepared to treat law . . .
as an instrument to be used wherever it looked as if it would be useful.” Id. at 10.
67. Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional
Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 59–60 (1987).
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reach from the public into the private sphere.68 Not incidentally,
during this time period, commonly known as the Lochner era, the
Court typically decided cases pursuant to formalist reasoning, invali-
dating economic regulations without inquiring into the context or
empirical effects of the laws.69 In Lochner v. New York, the Court ac-
knowledged that the state legislature, in appropriate circumstances,
could regulate for the common good, but nonetheless held unconsti-
tutional a state law limiting the hours of bakery employees.70 The
justices reasoned that the job of a baker was not “unhealthy” to “the
common understanding,”71 despite empirical evidence showing other-
wise.72 More than three decades later, in Carter v. Carter Coal Com-
pany, the Court invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act
as beyond Congress’s commerce power.73 The Carter Court categori-
cally defined mining to be “a purely local activity” while disregarding
the broader effects of mining on commercial intercourse.74 In these and
similar cases, formalism facilitated the Court’s efforts, in accordance
with laissez-faire ideology, to protect the economic marketplace from
government regulation.75
Pressures arising from immigration, urbanization, and industrial-
ization, as well as the catastrophe of the Great Depression, eventually
led to a transformation of democratic government in the 1930s.76 On
the one hand, republican democracy had long emphasized the virtu-
ous pursuit of the common good, a substantive goal, while readily
accepting the political exclusion of wide swaths of the population.77
For much of American history, African Americans, women, religious
68. Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1196–204
(1985); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 478 (1988).
69. Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property,
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 558–59, 571 (1996).
70. 198 U.S. 45, 51, 64–65 (1905).
71. Id. at 59.
72. See id. at 67–73 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the state legislature
relied on empirical evidence).
73. 298 U.S. 238, 273 (1936).
74. Id. at 304.
75. For another example of formalist reasoning, see R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co.,
295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935) (invalidating the Railroad Retirement Act as class legislation
contravening the common good and thus beyond Congress’s commerce power).
76. Books discussing aspects of the transformation of democracy include the follow-
ing: LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO, 1919–1939
2–5 (1990); FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 11, at 14–45, 153–208, 291–382;
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 1–3 (1993); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCON-
TENT 6–7 (1996). Bruce Ackerman also emphasizes regime change in constitutional law. His
discussions of the key decade of the 1930s are spread over two volumes. BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE (VOL. 3): THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE (VOL. 2): TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
77. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 11, at 23–24, 38.
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minorities, and immigrants were deemed insufficiently virtuous to
contribute to the common good.78 On the other hand, pluralist democ-
racy, emerging in the 1930s, posited more widespread participation
and the legitimate pursuit of self-interest.79 Pluralist democracy thus
emphasized crucial processes, such as voting, that ostensibly allowed
all citizens to voice their respective values and interests within a
free and open democratic arena.80 In the 1940s and 1950s, political
theorists described pluralist democracy as the best means for accom-
modating “our multigroup society.”81
During the Cold War era, political and constitutional theorists
defended democracy against totalitarianism as embodied by the Soviet
Union and its satellites. Totalitarian government dictated public
values and goals, but pluralist democracy determined public values
and goals “through the free competition of interest groups.”82 By “com-
posing or compromising” their different values and interests,83 the
“competing groups [would] coordinate their aims in programs they
can all support.”84 Legislative decisions arose from negotiation,
persuasion, and the exertion of pressure through the channels of the
democratic process.85 And indeed, throughout the first decades of plu-
ralist democracy, the normal operation of the democratic process
frequently led the government to reach into the private sphere and
regulate the economic marketplace (think of the New Deal).86 Even so,
the pluralist democratic emphasis on processes eventually led theo-
rists to argue that the primary function of government was to provide
a neutral framework of procedures allowing individuals and interest
groups to assert their respective values and interests—whether in
the public or the private sphere.87
78. Id. at 23–45; SANDEL, supra note 76, at 123–67.
79. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 11, at 314–16.
80. JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE 176 (1939); see SANDEL, supra note 76, at
167 (discussing transition to procedural republic or democracy).
81. WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. MOOS, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS
9 (1949).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 8.
85. Id. at 10–11. Robert Dahl developed the most comprehensive explanation of the
democratic process. ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?
(2d ed. 2003); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989); ROBERT A. DAHL, A
PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC
THEORY (1956).
86. For histories of the New Deal, see ANTHONY J. BADGER, THE NEW DEAL: THE DE-
PRESSION YEARS, 1933–1940 (1989); COHEN, supra note 76; WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL (1963).
87. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996 ed.) (articulating the philosophy of
political liberalism); SANDEL, supra note 76, at 3–24, 28, 250–73 (explaining procedural
republic).
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Just as the practice of republican democracy had transformed
over time, particularly in response to the rise of laissez-faire ideology,
the practice of pluralist democracy also transformed, particularly in
response to the ideology of neoliberalism.88 While the Cold War had
prompted Americans, including American corporations, to defend
democracy, then the end of the Cold War opened American democ-
racy to neoliberal attacks from within.89 Think of neoliberalism as
laissez-faire on steroids.90 Laissez-faire ideology celebrated the free
market; neoliberalism went further by demonizing democratic gov-
ernment. Laissez-faire theorists maintained that the invisible hand
operates through the free market to naturally generate individual
satisfaction and societal good.91 Neoliberal theorists agreed, but they
added that an inverse (and perverse) invisible hand operates through
democratic processes.92 Even well-meaning elected officials inevita-
bly lead democratic government to pursue suboptimal and often
corrupt goals. Given the ostensible functionality of the marketplace
and dysfunctionality of democratic government, neoliberals concluded
that government reach into and regulation of the private sphere
should be severely constrained, for the greater good of all.93
Similar to the Lochner-era Supreme Court, which had become
more formalist in response to laissez-faire ideology, the conservative
Court of the late-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries became
more formalist in response to neoliberal ideology. These parallel
formalist shifts are stark in congressional power cases under the Com-
merce Clause.94 In the late 1930s, once the Court accepted pluralist
democracy and repudiated Lochner-era formalism, the Court deter-
mined the scope of Congress’s commerce power pursuant to a rational
basis test that focused on empirical reality rather than a priori cate-
gories.95 In practice, this doctrinal approach led the Court to defer
88. For a history of neoliberalism, see DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEO-
LIBERALISM (2005).
89. FELDMAN, FAILING CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 130–52, 162–73; see JOHN
LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY 237–57 (2005) (discussing end of Cold
War); JAMES T. PATTERSON, RESTLESS GIANT 194–95 (2005) (same).
90. For an extensive discussion of neoliberalism, see DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS
OF THE UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIEDMAN, AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS (2012).
91. Jacob Viner, The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire, 3 J. OF L. & ECON. 45, 61
(1960).
92. On the operation of the economic marketplace, see Milton Friedman, Adam
Smith’s Relevance for 1976, Selected Papers No. 50, at 15. About democratic government,
Friedman wrote: there is an “invisible hand in politics [that] is as potent a force for harm
as the invisible hand in economics is for good.” Id. at 18.
93. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 94–95 (Ronald Hamowy
ed. 2011) (arguing against government planning because of the complexity of social reality).
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
95. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555–56 (1985) (upholding
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to the democratic process.96 The Court refrained from imposing
judicial limits on congressional power per se.97 From the late 1930s
onward, for nearly six decades, congressional power would be checked
at the ballot box, not at the courthouse.98
Under the sway of neoliberal ideology, however, the Rehnquist
Court reintroduced formalist methodology to commerce power cases
in 1995.99 In United States v. Lopez, the Court held that Congress
had exceeded its power when it enacted the Gun-Free School Zones
Act, which proscribed the possession of firearms at school.100 Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion for the conservative
bloc of five justices (Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O’Connor joined
Rehnquist’s opinion).101 He reasoned that Congress can regulate
“three broad categories of activity”:102 the channels of interstate com-
merce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities
substantially affecting interstate commerce.103 Rehnquist focused on
the final category, substantial effects, but imbued it with a formalist
twist.104 Distinguishing between economic and noneconomic activities,
Rehnquist maintained that gun possession at schools is a noneconomic
enterprise that “has nothing to do with ‘commerce.’ ”105 Next, distin-
guishing between national and local concerns, Rehnquist reasoned
that gun possession at schools is a local matter.106 His terminology,
minimum wage and overtime requirements of Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to
state employees); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (uphold-
ing the Filled Milk Act); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 1 (1937) (up-
holding the National Labor Relations Act of 1935).
96. “[T]he fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the
Commerce Clause . . . is one of process rather than one of result.” Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).
97. The Court, though, continued to limit the federal government in accord with
other constitutional guarantees, such as free expression. See, e.g., Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 679–80 (1944) (holding that federal government could not
denaturalize because of opinions expressed after citizenship was granted); Schneiderman
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 160–61 (1943) (holding that federal government could not
denaturalize Russian-born citizen for prior statements).
98. Between 1937 and the early 1990s, the Court upheld every challenged congressional
exercise of its commerce power, with the sole exception of a single 1976 case, which the
Court overruled within a decade. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
99. The Court began this formalist turn in a decision invalidating congressional ac-
tion but focusing more on the Tenth Amendment. New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 187–88 (1992).
100. 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995).
101. Id. at 549.
102. Id. at 558.
103. Id. at 558–59.
104. Id. at 561.
105. Id.
106. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68.
2019] FREE-SPEECH FORMALISM AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE 61
dividing “what is truly national and what is truly local,”107 resembled
Lochner-era formalist language separating “a purely federal matter”108
from “a matter purely local in its character.”109 By parsing congres-
sional power pursuant to these formalist categories, the Court con-
cluded that Congress had exceeded its commerce power.110
The Roberts Court followed Lopez and extended its formalist
reasoning in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
which invalidated part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).111 The
ACA’s individual mandate required most Americans to maintain
“minimum essential” health insurance coverage.112 Individuals failing
to comply with the mandate were required to pay a “penalty” to the
Internal Revenue Service.113 When determining whether Congress
had exceeded its commerce power in enacting the individual mandate,
Roberts’s opinion applied the Lopez doctrine while also articulating
and applying two new formalist categories.114 First, distinguishing
action from inaction, Roberts reasoned that Congress can regulate
activity but not inactivity pursuant to the Commerce Clause.115 The
individual mandate forced individuals to buy health insurance even
when they did not want to do so.116 Congress had therefore over-
stepped its commerce power, Roberts concluded, because the man-
date compelled inactive individuals to enter or become active in the
health insurance market.117 Second, distinguishing regulation from
creation, Roberts reasoned that Congress can regulate but not create
commerce.118 With the individual mandate, Roberts maintained,
Congress exceeded its power by attempting to create commercial
activity where none previously existed.119
Why do conservative justices prefer formalism over more realist
or substantive approaches to judicial decision-making? The answer
107. Id.
108. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 274 (1918).
109. Id. at 276.
110. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68.
111. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
112. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012).
113. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(c), (g)(1) (2012).
114. Feldman, Chief, supra note 1, at 342–43.
115. Id.
116. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2586–87.
117. Id. The other conservative justices (the joint dissenters) completely agreed with
Roberts on this point, even though they did not join his opinion. Id. at 2644, 2648–49.
118. Id. at 2586.
119. Again, the other conservative justices completely agreed with Roberts on this
point. Id. at 2644, 2647. Roberts nonetheless upheld the individual mandate pursuant
to Congress’s taxing power. Id. at 2599–600. Roberts followed similar formalist reasoning
in concluding that Congress had surpassed its spending power in the ACA provisions ex-
panding the Medicaid program. Id. at 2602–04.
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lies in the connection between legal reasoning and political ideology.
To understand this connection, it helps to emphasize the difference
between formal and substantive equality.120 Government pursuit of
substantive equality requires an inquiry into and recognition of the
degree to which people can actually exercise power. For instance, to
what degree does economic wealth affect or determine the exercise
of power in the private and public spheres? To what degree does a
history of subjugation affect or determine the exercise of power in
the private and public spheres? Substantive equality emphasizes the
importance of social context in evaluating equality.121 Consequently,
the government can pursue substantive equality in two general
ways—both contingent on the Court allowing democratic govern-
ment to exercise sufficient regulatory power over the private sphere.
First, the government can seek to redistribute wealth, power, or both
within the private sphere. For instance, the government can raise
tax rates on the wealthy. Or the government can set a minimum wage
rather than allowing employers to pay employees as little as the
market will bear. Second, the government can inhibit the exercise
of private power in the public sphere. For example, the government
can limit how much individuals and corporations can spend on or
contribute to political campaigns. Thus, even if the wealthy continue
to exercise excessive power in the private sphere, their public-sphere
power can be constrained.122
Legal formalism helps conservative justices impede such gov-
ernment attempts to attain substantive equality. More specifically,
formal equality insists the government must treat all people the
same under the law.123 Formal equality assumes (or pretends) that
all are the same regardless of wealth, regardless of histories of sub-
jugation, regardless of social contexts that, in reality, influence the
degree of power people can exercise in the private and public spheres.
Formal equality precludes the precise inquiries into the exercise of
power that the pursuit of substantive equality requires.
In short, formalism contains an inherent political tilt favoring
those who already wield power in the private sphere. Formalism
120. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values
in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1473 (2004) (discussing
two types of equality); see supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court affirmative action decisions).
121. Lakier, Antisubordinating, supra note 56, at 2122–23 (discussing formal and
substantive equality).
122. ROBIN WEST, The Missing Jurisprudence of the Legislated Constitution, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 79 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (arguing that
legislatures should pursue substantive rather than merely formal equality).
123. Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1021, 1024 (2014)
(discussing the relationship between formal and substantive equality).
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favors the wealthy over the poor, whites over people of color, men over
women, straights over LGBTQ. In a formalist legal regime, the gov-
ernment must efface, deny, or ignore all of the structures of power
embedded in the private sphere, including racism, sexism, antisemi-
tism, and homophobia.124 To illustrate, those with greater wealth
naturally wield greater power in the private sphere. Walmart execu-
tives exercise power over Walmart cashiers, not vice versa.125 And if
left unimpeded, the wealthy can transform their private sphere power
into greater public sphere muscle. Empirical research unsurprisingly
demonstrates that government officials pay more attention to
wealthy donors than to the poor.126 If Congress were to enact a law
that adjusts the relationship between the private and public spheres—
for instance, a campaign finance law that limits spending—then
Congress would be, in effect, pursuing substantive equality. But a
Court enforcing formal equality could readily invalidate any such
government pursuit of substantive equality. A campaign finance law
limiting spending does not treat the wealthy the same as the poor.
Such a law ostensibly imposes greater restraints on the wealthy
(since they could afford to spend more) and therefore violates formal
equality. By reaching such a conclusion, though, the Court would al-
low the wealthy (and whites, and men, and straights, and so on) to
continue exercising their private sphere power in both the private
and public spheres.127
Thus, in accord with neoliberal ideology, the conservative justices
have persistently used formalist reasoning to narrow government
power and to protect the private sphere, especially marketplace ac-
tors and transactions.128 Lopez and Sebelius might be among the most
notorious examples, but there are many others.129 Going beyond
124. See Lakier, Antisubordinating, supra note 56, at 2138–39 (arguing that the Court’s
formalism causes an emphasis on private power). I agree with much of Lakier’s argu-
ments about free-speech formalism, but from my perspective, she attributes too much
causal power to legal doctrine and theory without accounting for the dynamic interaction
between law and politics. See Stephen M. Feldman, Missing the Point of the Past (and the
Present) of Free Expression, 89 TEMPLE L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2017) (praising and criticizing
Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166 (2015)).
125. Steven Greenhouse, How Walmart Persuades Its Workers Not to Unionize, THE AT-
LANTIC (June 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/how-walmart
-convinces-its-employees-not-to-unionize/395051 [https://perma.cc/5EFJ-5YDT]; see, e.g.,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (refusing class certification
against Walmart despite alleged widespread sexual discrimination in pay and promotions).
126. LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY 2–3, 285–86 (2008).
127. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721,
754–55 (2011) (invalidating law providing public funding to equalize campaign spending).
128. See Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, THE NEW REPUBLIC
(Aug. 23, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law
-textual-originalism [https://perma.cc/F3SM-24DC] (arguing that Scalia’s textual original-
ism was politically conservative).
129. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (invalidating state law limiting
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these patent judicial limitations of the congressional commerce power,
the Court has expressed deep skepticism about the capability of Con-
gress to act rationally—a skepticism that again resonates with the
neoliberal distrust of democratic government.130 The Rehnquist Court
began displaying such skepticism in Lopez and other congressional
power cases.131 The Court, for instance, started questioning whether
Congress had made sufficient findings of fact to support its legisla-
tive actions.132 In these cases, the conservative justices showed no re-
spect for congressional expertise in the legislative realm. Instead, the
Court suggested that Congress needed to deliberate more extensively,
making more precise findings that might help the legislators avoid
egregious error.133
The Roberts Court conservatives have continued to press for
congressional findings. Most significant, in Shelby County v. Holder,
a five-to-four decision, the Court invalidated a provision of the Voting
Rights Act, passed pursuant to Congress’s power under the Fifteenth
Amendment.134 The coverage provision of the Act specified which
jurisdictions needed special government approval or preclearance
before they could change their voting laws.135 The Court, in an opinion
by Roberts, acknowledged that the coverage provision was sensible
marketing use of consumers’ pharmaceutical data); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000) (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 527 (1997) (invalidating Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993); see FELDMAN,
FAILING CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 173–86 (discussing numerous cases where
Roberts Court protected economic marketplace and actors).
130. In accord with neoliberalism, public choice theorists apply economic analysis to pub-
lic decision-making to show that majority voting, as in democracy, is frequently an irra-
tional means for making group decisions. According to public choice, when the government
legislates, the legislative decisions do not rest on a rational calculation of costs and benefits.
They arise instead from interest group machinations. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 1–11, 38–61 (1991); see WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM
AGAINST POPULISM 1 (1982) (arguing social choice theory calls democracy into question).
131. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act); Flores,
521 U.S. at 536 (invalidating Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
132. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614–15; Flores, 521 U.S. at 530–31; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
133. Flores, 521 U.S. at 530; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562–63; see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615
(acknowledging congressional findings but dismissing them as inadequate). This judicial
request for congressional findings reinstituted another dormant doctrinal mechanism
from the Lochner era. E.g., Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68–69 (1922) (invalidating statute
partly because Congress had failed to find specific facts showing that the regulated activity
burdened interstate commerce); see Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 31–33, 37–38 (1923)
(upholding statute similar to the one invalidated in Hill partly because Congress made
sufficient findings); A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress:
The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 328, 356 (2001) (describing “rigorous review of the legislative record”
as characteristic of pre-1937 Supreme Court decision-making).
134. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
135. § 4(b), 79 Stat. 438.
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in 1965, when Congress first enacted the statute.136 Congress, though,
had reauthorized the Act several times over the years,137 and the
Court concluded that the coverage provision did not fit the nation’s
current circumstances.138 “Coverage today is based on decades-old
data and eradicated practices.”139
Yet, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Shelby County dissent pointed
to extensive and detailed congressional findings.140
Congress determined, based on a voluminous record, that the
scourge of [voting] discrimination was not yet extirpated . . . .
With overwhelming support in both Houses, Congress concluded
that, for two prime reasons, [the Act] should continue in force,
unabated. First, continuance would facilitate completion of the
impressive gains thus far made; and second, continuance would
guard against backsliding. Those assessments were well within
Congress’ province to make and should elicit this Court’s un-
stinting approbation.141
Ginsburg’s dissent highlighted the conservative majority’s disdain
for Congress and its democratic processes.142 The Court did not merely
ask Congress to make more specific findings. Rather, the Court de-
manded that Congress make different findings.143 In short, the conser-
vative justices might not have been satisfied by any congressional
findings, given that the justices apparently did not approve of the
substance of Congress’s action. And in fact, as Ginsburg feared, the
Court’s invalidation of the preclearance provision prompted an out-
burst of discriminatory attacks on the democratic process.144 In recent
136. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2617.
137. Id. at 2620–21.
138. Id. at 2628 (“In 1965, the States could be divided into two groups: those with a
recent history of voting tests and low voter registration and turnout, and those without
those characteristics. Congress based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today the
Nation is no longer divided along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat
it as if it were.”).
139. Id. at 2627. Robert’s opinion suggested that Congress left the Court with no choice
but to invalidate the statutory provision. The Court had sidestepped a similar constitu-
tional challenge to the Act several years earlier and had encouraged Congress to update
the coverage formula. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204
(2009). “Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare [the provision]
unconstitutional. The formula in that section can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting
jurisdictions to preclearance.” Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631. “Congress must ensure
that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.” Id.
140. Id. at 2635–36, 2642–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2632–33 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 2642–44.
144. CAROL ANDERSON, WHITE RAGE: THE UNSPOKEN TRUTH OF OUR RACIAL DIVIDE
148–54 (2016) (on the ramifications of Shelby County); JONATHAN BRATER ET AL.,
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years, more than twenty-one states have enacted laws restricting
suffrage.145 Of course, a neoliberal Court is unlikely to worry about
the democratic process because the justices do not respect democracy
as a form of societal decision-making.146 Once again, by weakening
democratic government, the justices enhanced the power of those indi-
viduals and entities already brandishing significant resources and
power in the private sphere.147
III. FREE-SPEECH FORMALISM
As revealed, the current politics of constitutional formalism im-
mobilizes democratic government while enhancing private-sphere
powers. The inequities of the private sphere are allowed to deepen
and spread across both the private and public spheres. Free-speech
formalism is one specific illustration of this broader constitutional
strategy. As such, free-speech formalism works hand-in-hand with
the politics of formalism in general.148
Free-speech formalism is most obvious in the Court’s campaign
finance decisions. In these cases, the conservative justices interpret
the First Amendment as a formal rule imposing absolute protections
of expression—expression ostensibly manifested by spending on poli-
tical campaigns.149 The most renowned (or infamous) of these cases
is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, decided in 2010.150
In a five-to-four decision, the conservative bloc invalidated provisions
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) that imposed
limits on corporate (and union) spending for political campaign
PURGES: A GROWING THREAT TO THE RIGHT TO VOTE 1–4 (Brennan Center for Justice ed.,
2018) (detailing statistics on purging of voters since the Court decided Shelby County).
145. ZACHARY ROTH, THE GREAT SUPPRESSION: VOTING RIGHTS, CORPORATE CASH, AND
THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY 21–25 (2016) (on the Republican attack on
democracy).
146. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (holding that
political gerrymandering, no matter how extreme, is a nonjusticiable political question).
147. Legal formalism has additional political salience for lawyers, judges, and law pro-
fessors apart from the results in adjudication. By supposedly identifying a legal realm
separate and independent from a political realm, professionally accredited lawyers, judges,
and law professors justify for themselves an important niche in society and the economic
marketplace. Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of the Law-Politics Dichotomy, 33 BYU J.
PUB. L. 15, 23–27 (2019); Stephen M. Feldman, The Transformation of an Academic Disci-
pline: Law Professors in the Past and Future (or Toy Story Too), 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 471,
474–80 (2004).
148. See Louis Michael Seidman, Can Free Speech Be Progressive?, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
2219, 2219 (2018) (arguing that free speech, partly because of its history, cannot become
systematically progressive, even if progressives can occasionally wield it to help achieve
their goals).
149. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
150.  Id.
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advertisements.151 The Court’s majority opinion, written by Justice
Kennedy, began by articulating two first-amendment premises.152
First, reiterating a 1976 decision, Kennedy stated that spending on
political campaigns constitutes speech.153 Second, reiterating a 1978
decision, the Court stated that free-speech protections extend to cor-
porations.154 With those premises in hand, Kennedy moved to a pillar
of his reasoning, the self-governance rationale: free expression is a
prerequisite for democratic self-government.155 Thus, according to
the Court: “Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy . . . . The
right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information
to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government
and a necessary means to protect it.”156 Free expression must be ab-
solutely protected because democracy cannot exist without it.157
The Citizens United Court, that is, maintained that the First
Amendment must be enforced as a formal and rigid rule, regardless
of context or effects.158 Thus, Kennedy explained the limitation on
corporate campaign expenditures in the most alarming terms: “The
censorship we now confront is vast in its reach.”159 Because restric-
tions on corporate political expression destroy “liberty,”160 the gov-
ernment must satisfy strict scrutiny, proving that the regulation is
necessary (or narrowly tailored) to achieve a compelling purpose.161
Nevertheless, Congress had relied on extensive evidence showing that
corporate spending corrupted democracy.162 In fact, social science
151. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441(b)(a)–(b); Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-155, 116 Stat. 81; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 336–41; see Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 319–22 (discussing statutory restrictions).
152. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 336–42.
153. Id. at 336–41 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
154. Id. at 340–42 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
155. E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95–96 (1940); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 18, 26 (1948); Harry Kalven, Jr.,
The New York Times Case, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208.
156. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339.
157. See G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free
Speech In Twentieth Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (1996) (emphasizing
the development of free speech as a constitutional lodestar).
158. The Court also invoked the marketplace of ideas (or search-for-truth) rationale: the
Court reasoned that restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures interfere “with the
‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment.” Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 354 (quoting New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)).
159. Id. at 354.
160. Id. at 354 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 130 (James Madison) (B. Wright
ed., 1961)).
161. Id. at 340.
162. Id. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see McConnell v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003) (discussing congressional findings); e.g.,
Brief of Amici Curiae Hachette Book Group, Inc. and HarperCollins Publishers L.L.C. in
Support of Neither Party on Supplemental Questions at 13–14, Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205) (emphasizing congressional findings).
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research shows that excessive spending, whether corporate or other-
wise, can corrupt or distort democracy.163 The Court brushed aside
this empirical evidence by narrowing the definition of corruption so
dramatically that anything short of a bribe or the appearance of a
bribe would be permissible.164
The Court bolstered its formalist protection of corporate spend-
ing, as political expression, by invoking the constitutional framers
and original meaning. From James Madison and Federalist, Number
10,165 Kennedy concluded that “[t]here is simply no support for the
view that the First Amendment, as originally understood, would per-
mit the suppression of political speech by media corporations.”166
But this conclusion was so ahistorical as to be patently false. The
framers’ generation did not conceptualize corporations in a way that
would even resemble the profit-driven multinational behemoths that
dominate the twenty-first-century marketplace.167 During the early
decades of nationhood, corporations could be formed only when legis-
latures specially chartered them—general incorporation laws did not
exist—and legislatures rarely granted such special state charters.168
Moreover, legislatures almost never granted corporate charters to
businesses that focused solely on profit-making. Instead, pursuant
to a lingering premodern mercantilist outlook, states would charter
corporations that promoted the common good by performing a function
useful to the public, such as the building of infrastructure, including
roads, bridges, and canals.169
Although the Court’s conclusion about the framing was ahistor-
ical, the Court’s constitutional protection of corporate expression
harmonized closely with the conservative bloc’s neoliberal ideology.170
While the Court tied its reasoning to the self-governance rationale
and the democratic process, decisions such as Lopez and Shelby
163. LARRY M. BARTELS ET AL., Inequality and American Governance, in INEQUALITY
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 88, 113–17 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005).
164. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356–60.
165. Id. at 354–55 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed.,
1961)).
166. Id. at 353.
167. On the size and operation of corporations today, see JOEL BAKAN, THE COR-
PORATION (2004); JEFFRY A. FRIEDEN, GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2006).
168. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 179–81 (2d ed. 1985) (giving
examples of corporate charters from early nineteenth century); see id. at 194–96 (discussing
introduction of general incorporation laws).
169. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 14–17 (1970) (discussing corporations in early
national years); Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation,
50 WM. & MARY Q. 51, 53–55 (1993) (discussing the limitation that corporations were to
pursue the common good).
170. Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: The First Amendment and Class
Entrenchment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161, 2166–67 (2018).
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County, which constrained government power and questioned con-
gressional deliberations, underscore that the conservative justices
are not truly committed to protecting or bolstering democratic gov-
ernment. But the Court is committed to protecting private-sphere
economic power and the extension of that power into the public sphere.
From that perspective, the Citizens United decision seemed totally
predictable. And in subsequent campaign finance cases, the Roberts
Court continued using formalist reasoning to protect economic power
in the public sphere.171 Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club
PAC v. Bennett arose when the state of Arizona created a campaign-
finance “matching funds scheme”: A candidate for state office who
accepted public financing would receive additional funds if a privately
financed opponent spent more than the publicly financed candidate’s
initial allocation.172 Publicly and privately financed candidates there-
fore could spend roughly the same amounts on their respective cam-
paigns. In a five-to-four decision, the conservative bloc held that this
campaign finance scheme violated the First Amendment.173 The Court
reasoned that the flexible public financing system imposed a “penalty”
by diminishing the privately financed candidate’s expression.174 In
dissent, Justice Kagan argued that the financing scheme, when viewed
in context, was the opposite of a penalty. The public financing, she
wrote, “subsidizes and so produces more political speech.”175 But the
conservative majority insisted on applying a formal rule: Any regu-
lation of campaign financing constituted an unconstitutional burden
on free speech.176 “[E]ven if the matching funds provision did result
in more speech by publicly financed candidates and more speech in
general, it would do so at the expense of impermissibly burdening
(and thus reducing) the speech of privately financed candidates and
independent expenditure groups.”177 The Court’s formalist approach
to free speech mandated that an individual be allowed to translate
private-sphere wealth into political power. The First Amendment,
as interpreted by the Court, prohibited the government from at-
tempting to correct for that economic skewing of political power; for
instance, by providing equal funding to the less wealthy.
In American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, the Court
invalidated a Montana statute providing that a “corporation may not
make . . . an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political
171. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 727–28
(2011).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 736.
175. Id. at 763 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
176. Id. at 741.
177. Bennett, 564 U.S. at 7741.
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committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political
party.”178 The Montana Supreme Court had upheld this statute in
the face of a First Amendment challenge that relied on Citizens
United.179 The Montana Court reasoned that the specific history in
the state—of corporate corruption of democracy—supported the
state’s claim that the regulation was narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling purpose.180 In another five-to-four decision, the U.S. Su-
preme Court reversed the Montana Court.181 The conservative bloc
reasoned that “[t]here can be no serious doubt” that Citizens United
controlled and precluded the state from even attempting to demon-
strate that its factual situation was unique.182 The Citizens United
prohibition on campaign finance restrictions must be applied regard-
less of context or effects.183 In a subsequent campaign finance case,
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, explicitly defended a
formal free-speech rule prohibiting any restriction on campaign
financing.184 According to Thomas, all campaign spending, whether
contributions or expenditures, constitutes “[p]olitical speech [that]
is ‘the primary object of First Amendment protection’ and ‘the life-
blood of a self-governing people.’ ”185
To be clear, the Roberts Court’s formalism does not always
result in the judicial protection of free expression. To the contrary,
178. 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 13-35-227(1) (2011)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2491–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing W. Tradition P’ship v. Att’y
Gen., 363 Mont. 220 (2011)).
181. Id. at 2491.
182. Id.
183. Citizens United, in theory, applied equally to corporations and unions. But Knox
v. Service Emps. Int’l Union considered whether a public employee union imposing a
special assessment fee to support political advocacy had satisfied free-speech requirements
when it failed to allow nonmembers to opt out of the fee. 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2277 (2012).
The conservative bloc held that even if the union had provided an opt-out for the nonmem-
bers, it would have been insufficient to satisfy the First Amendment. Id. at 2289. After
this case, then, union efforts to raise money for political campaigns would face obstacles
beyond those faced by corporations. To compound problems facing unions, Janus v. Am.
Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31 held that workers cannot be forced to pay
union fees related solely to collective bargaining representation even though the workers
benefit from the representation. 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018).
184. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 228 (2014) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
185. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465–66 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
Thomas has also written a majority opinion that appeared to narrow the concept of content
neutrality while holding that all content-based restrictions must be subject to strict
scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015); see Adam Liptak, Court’s
Free-Speech Expansion Has Far-Reaching Consequences, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/courts-free-speech-expansion-has-far
-reaching-consequences.html [https://perma.cc/Q88L-6H62] (discussing potential reach
of the Court’s decision). The various concurrences in that case called into question, however,
whether the Court would truly follow such a rigid rule. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234, 2238–39.
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sometimes a formal rule ostensibly leads the Court to defeat a free-
speech claim.186 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, which raised a reli-
gious expression issue, provides an example.187 The city of Pleasant
Grove displayed in a public park several privately donated monu-
ments, including one showing the Ten Commandments, contributed
years earlier by the Fraternal Order of Eagles.188 Summum, a minority
religious group, offered to donate a monument showing its Seven
Aphorisms.189 The city refused to accept the monument.190 The case
resembled several Rehnquist Court decisions that had held public
school properties to be public forums open for Christian organiza-
tions.191 In one such case, Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the
University of Virginia, the Court held that the First Amendment
required a public university to fund an overtly religious student
newspaper.192 Such public forum decisions seemed to mandate that
Pleasant Grove display the Summum monument in its public park,
a traditional public forum.193 But the Court invoked a formal rule that
completely excused the government from First Amendment strictures:
“[T]he placement of a permanent monument in a public park is best
viewed as a form of government speech and is therefore not subject
to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.”194 In other words, under
the Court’s government speech doctrine, the display of the Summum
monument “is not a form of expression to which [public] forum anal-
ysis applies.”195
186. The formal rule defeating the free-speech claim might be derived from the First
Amendment itself but might instead be derived from some other source. See, e.g., Rucho
v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484, 2487 (2019) (invoking the political question doctrine to
defeat First Amendment and other constitutional challenges to gerrymandering schemes);
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019) (invoking the state
action doctrine to defeat free-speech claim).
187. 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009).
188. Id. at 464–65.
189. Id. at 465.
190. Id. at 465–66.
191. The Court has deemed property such as the streets and parks, open for public
speaking from time immemorial, to be a public forum. In the public forum, the First
Amendment prohibits the government from restricting speech based on its content
unless the government satisfies strict scrutiny. On other governmental property, how-
ever, the government can impose any reasonable restrictions on expression. Perry Educ.
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).
192. 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 (1995). For similar cases, see Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384 (1993).
193. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (noting that streets and parks had been
public forums since time immemorial).
194. Pleasant Grove City v. Summun, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009).
195. Id. at 464. “The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private
speech; it does not regulate government speech.” Id. at 467.
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This decision illustrates how the Court can invoke formal rules
to protect individuals and societal groups already possessing private-
sphere resources and power—such as mainstream Christian religions
or the wealthy—while the Court can simultaneously invoke formal
rules that allow the continued suppression and subjugation of indi-
viduals and groups lacking private-sphere resources and power—such
as the poor, racial minorities, and religious minorities. Whereas the
Court in previous cases had forced the government to bolster the
spread of mainstream Christian messages and values,196 the Summum
Court relied on a “recently minted” government speech rule to avoid
similarly buoying nontraditional or minority religious messages and
values.197 The Roberts Court has invoked a variety of formal rules to
preclude extending First Amendment protections to other peripheral
groups and their members.198 For instance, Manhattan Community
Access Corporation v. Halleck, decided in 2019, involved two producers
of public access programming, DeeDee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto
Melendez, who made a film protesting public access TV’s alleged ne-
glect of East Harlem, a neighborhood in Manhattan, New York City.199
New York City had contracted with the Manhattan Community Access
Corporation (MNN) to run its public access television channels, and
MNN aired the Halleck and Melendez film.200 But when some viewers
complained, MNN suspended the two producers from further access
to its TV facilities.201 Halleck and Melendez sued, claiming that MNN
had violated their free-speech rights by denying them access based
on the content of their expression.202 The Court applied an ostensible
formal rule, the state action doctrine, and held that MNN was not sub-
ject to First Amendment limitations because it was a private rather
than a government actor.203 The conservative bloc emphasized the im-
portance of the public-private dichotomy, particularly as it relates to
the protection of private property rights and “a robust sphere of indi-
vidual liberty.”204 They even paraphrased a quotation often attributed
196. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 103, 107 (2001); Rosenberger
v. Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825–26, 832, 845–46 (1995);
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 386–87, 396–97
(1993).
197. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).
198. See Manhattan Cty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019).
199. Id. at 1927.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1928, 1934. Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, persuasively argued that MNN
functioned as a state actor in this case. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1934 (Sotomayor, J., dis-
senting).
204. Id. at 1934; see id. at 1930–31 (emphasizing private sphere).
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to a conservative radio host, Dennis Prager: “It is sometimes said that
the bigger the government, the smaller the individual.”205
CONCLUSION
The Roberts Court is not firmly committed to protecting free ex-
pression. In numerous cases, the Court has found expression to be
outside of First Amendment guarantees.206 Moreover, the Court is
not firmly committed to applying formal rules in free-expression
cases. To be sure, as demonstrated above, the Court has purported
to articulate and apply formal rules in numerous First Amendment
decisions. Yet, just as surely, the Court has decided numerous free-
expression cases where it would be difficult to characterize the opin-
ion as formalist.207 What unifies most of these decisions, whether
formalist or not, is a conservative (neoliberal) commitment to pro-
tecting the private sphere, especially the economic marketplace and
economic actors—particularly those wealthy actors already wielding
economic power. Which parties have lost free-speech cases during
the Roberts Court era? Public employee unions,208 prisoners,209 high
school students,210 government employees,211 and those seeking an
205. Id. at 1934. Prager has said: “The bigger the government, the smaller the citizen.”
Quotes, JEFFERSON REVIEW, https://www.jeffersonreview.com/quotes/m-p [https://perma
.cc/6H5N-BHCF] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
206. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2010) (upholding punish-
ment of speech that might provide material support to foreign terrorist organizations, even
without proof of likely harm); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (upholding
punishment of high school student for displaying banner stating “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”);
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 524–25 (2006) (severely limiting prisoner access to written
materials and photographs); Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L.
REV. 723, 724 (2011) (noting that, overall, the Roberts Court has a “dismal record” in free-
speech cases); David Kairys, The Contradictory Messages of Rehnquist-Roberts Era
Speech Law: Liberty and Justice for Some, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 195, 195–96 (discussing
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ inconsistencies in free-expression cases).
207. E.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (holding that state law
restricting data mining in the pharmaceutical industry violates free speech); Morse, 551
U.S. at 396–97 (upholding punishment of high school student for displaying banner
stating “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”).
208. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2459–60, 2466 (2018) (holding that workers cannot be forced to pay union fees related
solely to collective bargaining representation even though the workers benefit from the
representation); Knox v. Service Emps. Int’l Union , 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284, 2295–96 (2012)
(holding that public employee union could not impose a special assessment fee to support
political advocacy even if union members could opt out).
209. Beard, 548 U.S. at 524–25 (severely limiting prisoner access to written materials
and photographs).
210. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396–97 (upholding punishment of high school student for
displaying banner stating “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”).
211. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 382–92 (2011) (limiting govern-
ment employee’s First Amendment right to petition the government); Garcetti v. Ceballos,
74 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:047
equal voice in democracy.212 In every instance, the party wielding
greater power has won the case. Moreover, in numerous cases, the
Roberts Court has further followed neoliberal ideology by denigrating
and weakening democratic government.
In sum, legal formalism in general and free-speech formalism
in particular matter.213 Yet, because of the dynamic interaction of
law and politics in Supreme Court decision-making, one should not
overstate the importance of formalism. Perhaps more so than any
other case, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. illustrates the unpredictable
and dynamic intersection of formalism and politics in free-speech
decisions.214 When pharmacies process prescriptions, they routinely
record information such as the prescribing doctor, the patient, and
the dosage.215 IMS Health Inc. and other data mining businesses buy
this information, analyze it, and sell or lease their reports to phar-
maceutical manufacturers.216 Subsequently, pharmaceutical sales-
persons, armed with this information, market their drugs more
effectively to doctors.217 A Vermont statute prohibited pharmacies
from selling this information so as to protect the privacy of patients
and doctors and to improve public health.218 When the Court adjudi-
cated the constitutionality of this legislation in Sorrell, the progressive
547 U.S. 410, 413–26 (2006) (limiting free-speech rights of government employees by dis-
tinguishing between speech as a citizen and speech as an employee).
212. E.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484, 2487 (holding that constitution-
ality of extreme political gerrymandering was nonjusticiable political question); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010) (invalidating restrictions
on corporate campaign spending).
213. One way that formalism matters—and a way I have not discussed in this Essay—
arises from the potential impact that Supreme Court decisions and doctrines have on the
lower courts. E.g., Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs.,
648 F.3d 1235, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (invalidating individual mandate in Affordable Care
Act); Passaic Daily News v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1543, 1546–49 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (relying on
an arguably formalist Supreme Court rule to find that newspaper-employer did not need
to reinstate a columnist-employee who lost privileges because of union activities); Jian
Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 436–37, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (relying on an
arguably formalist Supreme Court rule to conclude that Chinese company operating an
Internet search engine had a First Amendment right to make editorial judgments); see
Lakier, Antisubordinating, supra note 56, at 2148–49 & nn.165, 167 (discussing effect
of formalist rule relating to editorial freedom). Yet, the law-politics dynamic also affects
the interpretation and application of legal rules in the lower courts. In other words, lower
courts do not apply a pure law bereft of politics. For discussions of the influence of law
and ideology in lower court decision-making, see FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST
DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 125–31 (2010).
214. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
215. Id. at 558.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 558–59. The law would protect public health by encouraging doctors to pre-
scribe drugs in their patients’ best interests rather than because of effective pharmaceutical
marketing. Id. at 572.
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dissenters were the ones arguing for a more formalist approach. They
characterized the statute as a police power regulation of the eco-
nomic marketplace.219 As such, they reasoned that it did not trigger
First Amendment protections at all.220 From this perspective, the
Court did not even need to discuss free speech. The majority reasoned,
though, that the free-speech clause not only applied but also required
“heightened judicial scrutiny.”221 Pursuant to this standard, the Court
invalidated the statute.222 In short, the Court interpreted data mining
to be constitutionally protected expression rather than marketplace
activity, and in doing so, the Court extended First Amendment pro-
tections over the marketplace and its economic actors.223 Ultimately,
then, the neoliberal Court rejected the application of a formalist rule
in Sorrell but nonetheless protected private-sphere power as embod-
ied in pharmaceutical corporations.
219. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 580–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 563–64.
222. Id. at 580.
223. Id. at 557.
